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Against Ideology: Democracy and the human interaction sphere 
Philip A. Woods 
Chapter 2, in Ideologies in Educational Administration and Leadership, 
edited by Eugenie Samier, London: Routledge, 2016 
In the 1940s, Karl Mannheim (1943) advocated what he called militant 
democracy: ‘Our democracy has to become militant if it is to survive . . . 
[Democracy] becomes militant only in the defence of the agreed right procedure 
of social change and those basic virtues and values – such as brotherly love, 
mutual help, decency, social justice, freedom, respect for the person, etc. – which 
are the basis of the peaceful functioning of a social order’ (7). Mannheim wrote 
this in the shadow of aggressive totalitarian regimes. He offered an argument 
grounded in the proposition that there is a set of values (democratic values) that 
can be agreed upon and that have some fundamental, transcendent validity as 
guides to governance. There is an echo of this line of reasoning in calls to promote 
more explicitly and forcefully democracy, mutual respect and tolerance in 
response to concerns about contemporary terrorism.   1
This chapter argues that democracy should not be seen as an ideology and that it 
is important to be explicit about why this is the case. The chapter sets out a 
justification for the proposition that there is a democratic ideal that has a 
transcendent epistemological foundation, and draws a distinction between a rich 
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conception of democracy and ideologies. It seeks to position the democratic ideal, 
and democratic leadership that aspires to advance this ideal, within, or in relation 
to, modernism and the deconstructive, anti--foundationalist assumptions that are 
often associated with modernism (Lash 1999). It is argued that understanding 
democracy as having some degree of transcendent validity gives it greater warrant 
and power than seeing democracy as a counter--ideology in educational 
administration. 
The specific focus of the chapter is the notion of holistic democracy set out in 
prior work (Woods 2005, 2011; Woods and Woods 2013). Previously I have 
explored the affective roots of democratic leadership and suggested that these 
roots include a capacity for human ethical and spiritual awareness which tends to 
be less appreciated and understood in the dominant literature on leadership and 
education (Woods 2006). The argument for this human capacity draws from 
literature in psychology and spiritual studies (such as Cottingham 2005; 
Donaldson 1993; Hay 1982; Hay and Hunt 2000; G. Woods 2007; Woods and 
Woods 2010). The recognition of the capacity for ethical and spiritual awareness 
addresses in part what Joas (2000: 120) sees as an insufficiency of substance in 
Dewey’s (1929) notion of ‘sacralized democracy’ (120). According to Dewey, 
where communicating is simultaneously a means to an end and an end in itself, 
the person is ‘lifted from his immediate isolation and shares in a communion of 
meanings . . . there exists an intelligence which is the method and reward of the 
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common life, and a society to command affection, admiration, and 
loyalty’ (Dewey 1929, in Joas 2000: 119). For Joas, however, Dewey failed to 
address strongly enough the issue of ‘where the deep affective roots of democracy 
could lie in individuals and societies’ (122). 
Highlighting the capacity for ethical and spiritual awareness recognises an aspect 
of these roots that lies in individuals. This chapter explores an aspect of 
intersubjective interaction that is also able to feed into these affective roots. The 
chapter proceeds by setting out briefly a broad overview of contemporary 
struggles in education. The sections which follow conceptualise the distinction 
between ideology and non--ideology, and the notion of holistic democracy. 
Arguments for a grounding - a capacity for existential meaning (Lash 1999) - in 
modernity are then put forward, with particular attention being given to a modern 
capacity for intrinsic (non--instrumental) relationships examined through the 
notions of the social and human interaction spheres.   
STRUGGLES IN EDUCATION 
Whether or not we consider the policy trends in education today as threatening as 
the totalitarianism that Mannheim experienced and challenged, there is a struggle 
occurring in contemporary education. One way to characterise this is as a struggle 
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between instrumentalising trends and drivers to democracy (Woods 2013). 
Instrumentalising trends comprise a culture shift around an instrumentally driven 
business model of entrepreneurialism and innovation, structural changes 
institutionalising private, competitive values and managerialist priorities, growing 
reliance on network governance which can mitigate against democracy and 
participation, and exacerbation or reinforcement of power inequalities by aspects 
of post--bureaucratic changes. The promotion and justification of these trends 
form an ideology in the sense described below in the next section - specifically, a 
performative and neo--liberal ideology that appears so dominant in many 
countries (Ball 2008; Gunter and Fitzgerald 2015). 
Against these, there are trends and forces for change which include drivers to 
democracy (Woods 2011, 2013), comprising: instrumental drivers towards greater 
participation (the incentive to use democratic change in order to make 
organisations work more effectively); participative drivers (arising from the 
intrinsic conviction that people have a right to be involved in decisions that affect 
them, to have their voices heard and their rights to freedom respected); and 
expressive drivers (fueled by impulses to extend opportunities to express spiritual, 
artistic and creative drives, enjoy the warmth of caring human bonds, live 
ethically and to learn and grow as full human beings). 
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I have argued that examples of progressive change are a growing phenomenon in 
the creative spaces within performative culture and that these can be described as 
instances of democratic emergence which display elements of holistic democracy 
(Woods 2011; Woods et al forthcoming). They include diverse instances of 
progressive change - at the micro and meso levels - from classrooms to schools to 
larger networks promoting democratic, holistic and social justice values. These 
examples can be understood in the context of challenges to performative culture 
and managerialism expressed in discourses on new approaches to public 
governance and public service (Osborne 2010; Pierre and Eymeri--Douzans 2011; 
Wilkins 2014). 
The ideas that promote and justify the counter trends (the drivers to democracy) 
might be described as an ideology, or as a counter--ideology to the performative 
and neo--liberal ideology. However, I want to problematise this idea of a 
democratic alternative being an ideology, albeit a counter--ideology. 
Characterising the countering set of ideas as ideological presents them as being 
rooted in partial interests with its superiority dependent on enabling its power and 
interests to become dominant. The validity of the countering set of ideas becomes 
dependent on how the balances of power shift. If the performative and neo--liberal 
ideology dominates what is taken--for--granted truth, this is because its interests 
are able to dominate the discourse. The implication for a counter--ideology is that 
its principal focus must be shifting the balances of power so that they favour its 
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interests: breaking the discursive and institutional domination of the commanding 
ideology so that the counter version can be accepted. The problem with 
characterising change as a battle of ideologies, and not distinguishing a different 
kind of ideas set, is that validity becomes a function of power. This does not set a 
direction for progress. Rather, it confirms that all that matters is power. My 
argument is that the idea of holistic democracy as an alternative framework 
challenges the dominance of ideology by subverting the interests--bound 
epistemological basis of ideology. 
The next section distinguishes between ideological and non--ideological sets of 
ideas, and does this by engaging principally with Zizek’s (1994) discussion of 
ideology. 
IDEOLOGY AND NON--IDEOLOGY 
Giddens' (2006: 1020) succinct definition of ideology pinpoints its purpose: 
‘shared ideas or beliefs which serve to justify the interests of dominant groups’. 
Ideology, from whatever political perspective, implies a system of ideas and 
values that purports to make sense of the context and choices facing people as 
organisational actors. Ideologies act to construct and shape knowledge, and its 
presentations, in the interests of a particular power grouping. This does not mean 
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that everything the ideology asserts is invalid. A powerful feature of an ideology, 
as Zizek (1994: 6) argues, is its ability to disguise the interests it promotes within 
ideas that have some truth. The essential purpose of ideology, however, is to shape 
and present ideas in ways that favour certain relationships of power. Its function is 
to protect and promote ‘some relation of social domination (“power”, 
“exploitation”) in an inherently non-transparent way’ (6). Its fundamental 
aspiration is not the enlargement of truth and understanding. 
Where the essential aim is to constitute a framework of ideas which offers a guide 
to social action with greater validity and more robust understanding than an 
existing ideology, that framework is non--ideological. Positing such a framework 
as non--ideological can be criticised as an illusion, indeed a dangerous mistake 
that overlooks the power relations and assumptions about social reality that the 
posited alternative carries within it. Zizek (1994: 5) argues that ‘the stepping out 
of (what we experience as) ideology is the very form of our enslavement to it’, 
and cites the Neues Forum movement in the former East Germany which sought a 
utopian third way beyond capitalism and the socialism that then existed, but 
whose ‘sincere belief and insistence that they were not working for the restoration 
of Western capitalism’, argues Zizek,’proved to be nothing but an insubstantial 
illusion’. Avowedly non--ideological forms of thought produce only ‘the effect of 
depth’, but when subjected to critical examination they are mired in a (hidden) 
ideology (1994: 11). What is needed, according to this line of argument, is not a 
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true or truer conception of social reality, but a grasp of the conflicts and 
antagonisms that get in the way of understanding the whole (the latter always 
being only partially attained): ‘the ultimate support of the critique of ideology - 
the extra--ideological point of reference that authorises us to denounce the content 
of our immediate experience as “ideological” - is not “reality” but the “repressed” 
real of antagonism’ (16). An example from Marx’s work would be the 
understanding and appreciation of class struggle, which is masked by capitalist 
ideology.  
This reluctance to acknowledge the possibility of some conception of greater 
validity leaves the critique of ideology weakened, however, I would argue that 
some kind of more valid grounding, transcending particular interests, is necessary 
to enable those antagonisms to be recognised and described as such, and for 
suffering, inequalities and aspirations to social justice to be articulated as parts of 
the critique of ideological representations. The extra--ideological, critical 
viewpoint comes in my view from two directions (Woods 2005: 17-18). One - 
critical illumination - is from a concern with interests and the antagonisms that 
these underpin. These include inequities of distribution and access to material 
resources, social capital, cultural acceptance, status, and so on. This illuminates 
the portion of real experience that is repressed by a necessarily distorting 
ideology. This first direction of critique gives a voice to marginalised and 
disempowered interests.   
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The second direction - positive illumination - is from the positive view of 
humanity, centring on humanistic potential, and the recognition of the 
communicative capabilities and the spark of goodness and wisdom that enable and 
entitle everyone to have their say in the conduct of social life. This direction is 
grounded in some sense of transcendent validity. That is, it is supported by a basis 
for judging experience that is not simply personally subjective or the arbitrary 
product of a particular community, group or culture. This second direction of 
critique is integral to a rich conception of democracy (holistic democracy) which 
provides a framework within which to critically and positively illuminate that 
which ideology systematically overlooks. 
HOLISTIC DEMOCRACY 
The concept of holistic democracy has been built up through a critical 
appreciation of the notion of distributed leadership (DL). The latter understands 
leadership, not as a preserve of those in the topmost senior authority positions in 
an organisation, but as a phenomenon that is emergent from ongoing, diverse and 
complex interactions across the organisation and hierarchy. DL promises to 
recognise and harness the expertise and insights of diverse organisational actors, 
to the benefit of the organisation’s aims. However, whilst sounding more 
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democratic, it is capable of being subjected to and instrumentalised by the 
performative and competitive agendas of organisations (Woods and Woods 2013). 
The notion of DL requires deepening in a critical way. The concept of holistic 
democracy is intended to do this.  
Holistic democracy has its foundations in three strands of thought. First is the 
appreciation of social phenomena as emergent and complex. This reflects the 
sociological theory of analytical dualism (Archer 2003) and the representation of 
this as a trialectic process - an ongoing interaction between structure, person and 
practice (or action) (Woods 2005). The perspective of complexity theory (Stacey 
2012) feeds into this strand too, as well work that conceives leadership as 
emerging from various actors in a group or organisation (Gibb 1968; Gronn 
2002). This first strand is fundamental to DL as well as holistic democracy. The 
second and third key strands are crucial to the deepening of DL. The second 
strand is the recognition of an innate human capacity for ethical agency and the 
aspiration to, or a feeling for, an idea of human perfection - however difficult this 
may be to articulate or practice. This is the capacity for ethical and spiritual 
awareness referred to above. British Idealism (Boucher and Vincent 2000; Green 
1886) is one of the traditions of thought that has highlighted this. An essential 
point in this line of thinking is the view that there is something in the nature of 
‘ordinary consciousness’ that lays the basis for ethical and spiritual progress 
(Vincent and Plant 1984: 17). A third key strand is an appreciation of conceptions 
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of democracy that see the democratic process as more than clashes of narrow 
interest - in particular the idea of deliberative democracy, which seeks ways of 
transcending difference and enhancing mutual understanding (Saward 2003), and 
developmental democracy, which highlights both the ability of people to discover 
and bring to fruition ‘innate potential excellence’ and the policy imperative to 
provide the necessary conditions for self--development (Norton 1996: 62). 
Reflecting these strands of thought, the concept of holistic democracy is about 
both meaning and participation (Woods 2005, 2011; Woods and Woods 2013). 
Holistic democracy describes a way of working together which facilitates the 
growth and learning of individuals as whole people (meaning), as well as co--
responsibility, mutual empowerment and fair participation of all in co--creating 
their social and organisational environment (participation). These two aspects are 
further broken down analytically, creating four dimensions that provide a way of 
reflecting on how to deepen DL. The meaning dimensions of holistic democracy 
are holistic meaning (learning collaboratively, by integrating all our human 
capabilities - spiritual, intuitive and ethical, as well as intellectual and emotional - 
and seeking purpose guided by that aspect of ordinary consciousness that lays the 
basis for ethical and spiritual progress) and holistic well--being (experiencing an 
environment where there is a sense of belonging and connectedness - spiritually 
and ecologically, with nature - and both community and individuality, and where 
confidence and the capacity to think and feel for oneself are promoted). The 
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participative dimensions of holistic democracy are power sharing (inclusive 
involvement and shared responsibility for decision--making, providing 
opportunities for co--leadership) and transforming dialogue (respect, freedom to 
share views, increasing mutual understanding through people reaching beyond 
and working to overcome  individual narrow perspectives and interests).  
GROUNDING: THE SOCIAL AND HUMAN INTERACTION SPHERES 
A ket feature of the concept of holistic democracy is a foundational philosophical 
anthropology that views people as capable of creating more authentic accounts, 
values and understandings, and the claim that it is this capability that gives ethical 
validity to challenges to unjust power inequalities. My case for this foundational 
philosophical anthropology is three--fold - the philosophical recognition of being; 
the capacity for ethical and spiritual awareness and existential meaning, which is 
both individual and intersubjective and involves a modern capacity for intrinsic 
(non--instrumental) relationships; the existence in the micro--interactions in 
which these relationships are lived of a human interaction sphere which is able to 
generate compelling affective charges and ethical impulses that feed into the 
affective roots of democracy. These three aspects are addressed in turn, with most 
attention being given to the last. 
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Grounding in Being 
Firstly, at a deep philosophical level, there are profound implications in 
recognising our grounding in being. I find Dallmayr’s (2007: 49-50, 63, 73) 
highlighting of being in his discussion of the ‘good life’ helpful here. Dallmayr 
draws on the work of Jnanadev, the mediaeval Indian poet--saint and thinker. 
Jnanadev is against simplistic foundationalism (the view that enduring reality is 
grasped through certain concepts and theories, as expounded in holy scriptures or, 
we might say, certain philosophies of science), but explains how life and 
experience inherently negate the view that there is only ‘emptiness’. Being is what 
enables thought to happen; it is there before thought and epistemologies. I would 
say, following this, that the nature of one’s being - what kind of being one 
experiences - is of profound importance for what one learns and does. Being in a 
way that draws upon and develops the whole person (holistic well-being 
dimension of holistic democracy) grounds the active, developmental process of 
learning that enables progress towards holistic meaning. 
Grounding in Capacities for Existential Meaning 
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Secondly, people possess a capacity for ethical and spiritual awareness and 
existential meaning, which is both individual and intersubjective. The individual 
capacity was referred to near the start of this chapter and has been discussed in 
previous work (Woods 2006, 2011; Woods and Woods 2010). It is an influencing 
factor in people’s intersubjective activity and experience, fostering a sense of deep 
connection or ‘relational consciousness’ (Hay with Nye 1998). The focus here is 
not principally upon this individual awareness. It is on how intersubjective 
activity and experience, or interaction, can constitute a grounding, and I 
concentrate on this in the remainder of this sub--section and the following sub-
section.  
Lash’s (1999) argument for an alternative rationality in modernity sets out the 
case for a grounding that cannot be deconstructed or swept aside by modernist 
assumptions that no kind of valid and enduring understandings are identifiable or 
sustainable. Lash rejects the binary opposition between the cognitive certainty of 
positivism and the abandonment of enduring meaningful knowledge consequent 
upon an absolute constructivist epistemology. The modern actor is a reflexive 
subject who is called upon to make judgements because the rules of pre--modern 
thinking are not available in the taken--for--granted way they were before the 
onset of modernity. But, does this mean such judgements are necessarily and 
always arbitrary and reducible to personal subjectivity? Lash’s answer is that this 
is not so. People as sensate beings are able to relate to others (both human others 
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and objects), not inevitably and always as instruments to other ends, but as ends in 
themselves. They are capable of intrinsic relations which entail the experiencing 
of value and meanings that are qualitatively different from the arguments of logic. 
Existential meaning has not been lost to previous ages. What we need to recognise 
is where we can discover such meanings. They are not the product of logical or 
market place calculation. Lash (1999: 235) argues: 
We cannot understand the deaths of those close to us, births, long striven 
for life goals, falling in love, our children's joys and crises through the 
determinate meaning of logical statements. At issue instead is 
transcendental or existential meaning. What reflective judgement 
presupposes is simply that the path to these meanings is through the 
particular, through the eminently trivial, through everyday cultural 
artefacts and habitual forms of life. 
In terms of holistic democracy, Lash’s focus on interactions with the particular 
emphasises the character of connectedness that permeates holistic learning and 
well--being and how our sensitivity to the ways in which we experience the 
people and environment we inhabit can have profound implications for generating 
a sense of existential meaning. Understanding what values and ideas have an 
enduring validity is not the outcome of cognitive logic or discursive argument 
alone. Relationships in which the other is intrinsically valued is an essential 
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characteristic which, together with transforming dialogue and diminishing of 
power difference (the power sharing dimension of holistic democracy), facilitates 
movement towards more valid, transcendent understandings. Most importantly, 
such grounding in intrinsic relationships is not an illusory goal, but is a possibility 
and reality in modernity, argues Lash (1999: 9), particularly in the second, 
‘reflexive’ phase of modernity. 
Micro--interactions 
Thirdly, digging deeper into the nature of social interaction, it is possible to 
discern what contributes to this intersubjective grounding in the micro--
interactions that characterise social life. Understanding the nature of micro--
interactions has a crucial part to play in counteracting the argument that any 
notion of truth or larger validity is impossible at any level of interaction. The latter 
claim is that no exchange between people can achieve ‘access to reality unbiased 
by any discursive devices or conjunctions with power’ (Zizek 1994: 7), 
reinforcing the view that ideological thinking pervades all human encounters and 
discourses. However, this constructs an absolute claim that overlooks the 
individual and intersubjective capacities highlighted in this chapter. 
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The focus here is intersubjective activity and, in particular, the micro--interaction 
environment - that is, the sphere of micro (human and social) interaction and 
micro--structure. A strand of work in sociology has explored, on the basis of 
earlier sociological studies (Goffman 1969), the notion of ‘interaction order’. This 
refers to ‘the domain of face—to--face relations . . . And includes within its scope 
corporeal and emotional features of interaction’ (Shilling 1999: 546). In this 
people 
. . . are confronted with the necessity of establishing [and maintaining] 
relations with others, in order to construct a social self, and remain 
vulnerable within this domain: interaction occurs with arenas which 
expose people, physically and mentally, to others. 
(546) 
The ‘interaction order’ of personal contact is an arena in which meanings are 
exchanged and constructed, involves its own rules (such as turn--taking), and is a 
necessary characteristic of human life. Because of its own internal dynamics – the 
engagement of emotions for example, the generation and following of rules or 
protocols that may be specific to the people involved, and its distinction from 
larger (meso-- and macro--) structures – it has a degree of autonomy from the 
wider society in which it takes place.  
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Shilling – following Goffman and Rawls – highlights the moral demands that 
involvement in ‘interaction orders’ makes, consequent on coming up against other 
people. The moral perception of others in these exchanges has potential 
consequences for feelings such as guilt, status and self--esteem: ‘. . . this order 
makes moral not structurally coercive, demands on people’ (Shilling 1999: 546).  
The self as a ‘sacred object’ is, for example, open to ‘slights and profanations’ 
which require to be put right and forgiven (Goffman 1969: 25). The capacity to 
interact in a skilled and subtly responsive way is fundamental to society. Hence, 
people need to be socialised so that they become ‘self--regulating participants in 
social encounters’. But the substance of those interactions, according to Goffman, 
is socially constructed: by acquiring the abilities for interaction ‘the person 
becomes a kind of construct, built up not from inner psychic propensities but from 
moral rules that are impressed upon him from without’ (Goffman 1969: 35, 36).  
This claim is at odds with the perspective of analytical dualism in sociology and 
the significance accorded to the inner work of social agents through their internal 
conversations and orderings of ultimate concerns (Archer 2003) and their capacity 
for ethical and spiritual awareness. Goffman’s assertion also overlooks certain 
aspects of the dynamics of the interaction process – in particular, an aspect to 
which Bauman draws attention in his work on ethics and the sociology of 
morality. Bauman draws a distinction between the ‘societal sphere’, by which he 
means the structural relationships and institutions that comprise the usual focus 
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for sociology, and the ‘social sphere’, which has attracted much less sociological 
attention. This latter sphere – which I refer to as the human interaction sphere – is 
in essence the experience of ‘being with others’, the basic fact of life that each 
person is involved in interaction with the ‘human other’ (Bauman 1989: 179). 
This has consequences according to Bauman, which are qualitatively different 
from interaction with the natural environment. (Arguably, there are equally 
important and compelling experiences in relating to objects and the natural 
environment as intrinsically valued ‘others’, as Lash (1999) amongst others would 
argue, but this discussion will not be pursued here.) The human other is not 
experienced simply as a technical factor or representative of social structures 
(erratic, difficult to understand, a carrier of societal symbols of status, and so on), 
but as a subject which shares human--ness. From this there are, Bauman argues, 
fundamental ethical impulses. 
The human interaction sphere is a dimension of everyday micro--interaction. 
Some light can be thrown on the significance of this sphere by considering two of 
its features: 
- its capacity to generate ethical responses, evoked by the human other 
- its capacity to generate tacit knowledge about our own human-ness and 
our shared common human likenesses 
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The first feature involves responses that are evoked by the human other, which 
occur where there is proximity. Taking the term from Levinas, Bauman describes 
proximity as being neither special nor social, but as standing for ‘the unique 
quality of the ethical situation’: a ‘suppression of distance’ which presupposes 
‘humanity’ and is beyond intentionality (Bauman 1993: 87). In whatever way, 
which may not be spatial closeness, proximity is the immediacy of being with 
another human being and feeling that person to be human like one's self. I would 
put it like this, abstracting from Levinas and Bauman. Proximity possesses or has 
the capacity to generate an affective charge which is unlike that of other 
interactions. Thus Bauman’s focus – the ethical impulse that is evoked by 
proximity, namely the ‘moral command to be responsible’ to that human other 
(1993: 86) – is, I am suggesting, an example of that affective charge. 
Bauman emphasises that that responsibility is an unconditional, inexhaustible 
command on the person, which requires them to be permanently ready to rise to 
its requirements and, however often they may do this, is never diminished. It 
simply is, and if we try to talk to and reason about it, it is disarmed by the ‘reason-
mediated distance’ so created (1993: 86).   2
The second feature of the human interaction sphere is the creation of a certain 
kind of knowledge or understanding. This tends to be a form of tacit knowledge 
that consists of unarticulated insights and understandings generated by the 
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experience of proximity (which, like other forms of tacit knowledge, may be later 
theorised and translated into propositional knowledge). It is the outcome of the 
affective charge which characterises proximity and conjoins the ethical and 
affective. Moreover, at this level of the interaction order, the moral element is not 
socially constructed. Bauman’s unconditional ethical demand comes to be known 
through proximity. The human interaction sphere is also where, in recognising the 
other, one also recognises the other’s sense of self. This is learnt as tacit 
knowledge. That tacit learning is about the other as a human likeness of ourselves. 
We glimpse through this interaction, in which each person engages the other 
through their human senses, something of the reality we share as human beings 
(Simmel 1997). 
The human interaction sphere is embedded in other interactions. What I am 
suggesting is that the learning from the human interaction sphere can be 
analytically distinguished from the social interaction sphere as discussed by 
Shilling and Goffman. I am suggesting that as well as interaction and tacit 
learning through the interactive application of social rules, norms, and so on (in 
the social interaction sphere), there is also interaction with the other as a human 
being (the human interaction sphere) in which tacit learning takes place.  At the 3
same time as people are, in interaction, engaging their social identity with that of 
others, they are also engaging their human self with those same others as human 
selves. An example of the former (social interaction) is classroom interaction in 
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which a particular role (that of a teacher, say) is conducted, framed by a broader 
identity such as, inter alia, a working class background.  As well as this kind of 4
social interaction, there is a mutual recognition of the senses and the sense of self 
that make us each human (human interaction). This mutual recognition and the 
affective charge of proximity give a more profound and enduring meaning to the 
processes of the interaction order than changeable social rules and statuses. This 
renders the human being and relations ‘sacred’ in a different, more compelling 
sense than Goffman’s earlier reference to the self as a ‘sacred object’.  
These human interactions are a crucial dimension of the idea of sacralised 
democracy referred to above in relation to Dewey. They are integral to the 
possibilities for non--ideological practice, which include what Zizek (1994: 10) 
refers to as ‘the elusive network of implicit, quasi—“spontaneous” 
presuppositions and attitudes that form an irreducible moment of the reproduction 
of “non—ideological” (economic, legal, political, sexual . . .) practices’. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has argued that a radical challenge to ideology requires an opposition 
from a framework of thought that offers some degree of transcendent validity. 
Specifically, it has suggested that performative and neo--liberal ideology need to 
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be challenged by a rich conception of democracy, such as holistic democracy, 
which has a grounding in the individual and intersubjective capacities of people. 
Democracy is better seen, therefore, as a critique of ideology (Zizek 1994) and as 
utopian in the sense of an expression of the desire for a better way of being 
(Levitas 2010). 
The grounding - which can also be described as the affective roots of democracy - 
is individual and intersubjective. It includes the individual human capacity for 
ethical and spiritual awareness, which has been addressed in other work (Woods 
2006; Woods and Woods 2010). The focus in this chapter has been on 
intersubjective activity, particularly the arena of micro--interactions. In an 
examination of the latter, it has been suggested that an analytical distinction can 
be made between the social and human interaction spheres. The human interaction 
sphere consists of the interactions of the human self with others, interactions that 
are able to generate an intrinsically compelling affective charge that calls for a 
human, ethical response to the other. The human interaction sphere and its 
propensity to create such an ethical charge is an aspect of the grounding that is 
possible in the reflexive stage of modernity (Lash 1999). The sense of necessary 
response that the affective charge creates contributes to the navigational feelings 
(Woods 2005) that are valuable in understanding what it is ethically right to do.   
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The affective charge is intrinsically compelling, rather than being the product of a 
reasoned construction of moral responsibility. This is not to say that critical 
discourse and analytical thinking are not important. They are necessary in testing 
actions that are impelled by the ethical charge of the human interaction sphere. 
The transforming dialogue of holistic democracy requires both navigational 
feelings and analytical rationality (Woods 2005: 41). The intersubjective character 
of the human interaction sphere is also an important corrective to focusing solely 
on individual awareness and change. Theories of change that emphasise a belief 
that people’s ‘quality of awareness’ will dissolve systems (Scharmer and Kaufer 
2013) run the danger of overlooking the importance of context, including the 
effects of social inequalities and the distorting influence of ideologically driven 
discourses. The social interaction order (the interactive construction and 
application of social rules, norms, and so on, at the level of micro--interaction) 
can be a conduit for the formation and exercise of power differences and the 
shaping of identities that are not consciously chosen but imposed. We can make 
an analytical distinction between the social interaction order and the human 
interaction sphere, but in practice the flow of social life involves both occurring 
simultaneously. We are constantly processing both social and human interactions, 
and the influences of instrumentalising trends are strong and often insidious. 
Hence, the human interaction sphere is not a pure and unsullied part of daily life: 
the ability to discern and value it is something that has more often than not to be 
consciously struggled for. 
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The epistemology of democracy - how values and ideas with enduring validity 
that transcend narrow interests evolve - is fed at least in part by the capacity to 
recognise and nurture the affective and ethical value of the human interaction 
sphere within the context of other pressures and influences. The capacity for 
ethically charged human interaction and for responding to its fundamental ethical 
impulse underpins the possibility of basing education on something more 
worthwhile than an exclusive focus on measurability for testing and for ordering 
educational institutions and learners on hierarchical measures of worth. It 
underpins the validity and real--life applicability of Duncan--Andrade’s (2009: 
10) observation that at the end of the day ‘effective teaching depends most heavily 
on one thing: deep and caring relationships’. It underpins the growth of the 
‘ethical Self’ (Weber 2012: 181) that is integral to the idea of the creative 
university advancing knowledge through ‘collective human creativity’ (p173). 
The epistemology of democracy also involves co--creation through transforming 
dialogue and holistic learning. Evolving values and ideas that may have some 
degree of transcendent validity is an intersubjective and collaborative process. 
From a viewpoint such as that of Max Weber, shared existential meaning in plural 
and diverse modern societies may only be possible in occasional, contingent 
moments of commonality (Maley 2011: 26). This is not the conclusion to which 
recognition of the human interaction sphere and the individual capacities for 
!  26
ethical and spiritual awareness leads. There are interests and groups who are 
marginalised and systemically disadvantaged in contemporary education systems. 
A rich democracy addresses systematic social injustices. The full power of 
democracy, however, is not only as a vehicle for championing the weaker interests 
and aspiring to inclusive participation. Democracy in a form such as holistic 
democracy has, as a foundational principle, the aim of helping to nurture the 
individual and intersubjective capacities that people have to transcend interests 
and foster their human capabilities. Holistic democracy seeks more than 
contingent moments of commonality; rather, it aspires to the co--creation of daily 
lives that draw from and express the full human powers of people as connected 
beings. This grounding in transcendent human capacities is the fundamental 
power and credibility of democracy. 
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overwhelming, says PM’, 10th June 2014. Available HTTP: <http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-27778272> (accessed 4 August 2015).
 Whilst I would share much of Bauman’s concern about the effects of the ethics 2
of a rationalised world, there may be a loss of perspective in concentrating 
exclusively on the ethical responsibility that springs from the proximity of the 
human other. It precludes the person responding to the other as a human being, 
and vice versa, in ways that are not simply verbal, cognitive and distance creating. 
There is, in my view, an interactive element – hence the term human interaction 
sphere – which is apparent in the second feature.
 These can also be distinguished from the ‘practical order’, concerned with 3
interaction with material culture (artefacts) (Archer 2000: 166, 173), and the tacit 
learning that occurs through manipulation of artefacts.
 See, for example, Maguire (2005) who discusses class consciousness and 4
teachers.
